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3. Assembling the ‘ageing society’ 
In the previous chapter, I suggested that to address the challenges of the ageing society, we 
should focus on developing a conceptual framework that tackles the uncertainty, 
multiplicity and complexity of the scientific practices and technological processes that 
sustain it, and that this was best done through an engagement with Science and Technology 
Studies scholarly corpus. In particular, I argued that both sides of the nexus of ageing and 
technoscience should be open to investigation, resulting in a programme of research 
concerned with understanding how distributions of agency are enacted and pragmatically 
relate to each other. This, in turn, was motivated by the aim to genealogically trace the ‘the 
heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself’ (Foucault, 1991: 82): the ageing 
society. But what is the ageing society, from this knowledge-related, epistemic perspective? 
 In the introduction, I suggested that the usual answer to this question relates to the social, 
economic and political consequences that are seen to emerge from changes in population 
structure. Experts and policy makers disagree about that those consequences are, some 
viewing it as dictating fundamental changes to the nature of citizenship, while others see it 
as an opportunity fostering technological and social innovation and creativity. I have further 
argued that, rather than seeking to assess the rightfulness of each position, there is work to 
be done in understanding the forms of knowledge, the institutional basis and the normative 
foundations of each of the arguments. This means that instead of asking for the facts that 
make the ageing society – it’s population dynamics, etc – we ask: how, through what means 
and for what reasons did our societies came to be seen and described as ‘ageing societies’. 
How did the label of ‘ageing society’ become an authoritative and accepted description of 
our shared lives, of our present condition and common future?  How did it come to be 
‘gathered in a thing’, and what technoscientific practices and processes ‘make it exist and 
maintain its existence’ (Latour, 2004: 246)? This is the question this chapter, drawing on the 
approach previously outlined, aims to address.  
Taking as a point of departure key characterisations of the ‘ageing society’ articulated since 
the turn of the century, I then outline a genealogy of the relationship between the 
‘population problem’ and economy, articulated explicitly in actuarial sciences in the 19th 
century, and ultimately in the emergence of State backed social security in liberal 
democracies. However, I suggest that the ageing society is in fact a questioning of epistemic 
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infrastructure of the liberal welfare state, a problematization especially evident in the ‘social 
security crises’ of the early 1980s. As I will demonstrate, those crises were principally about 
the validity and reliability of expert knowledge, in that they concerned the failure of 
demographic calculations and economic forecasting to accurately predict increased life 
expectancies and correlated balances of social security programmes.  In the last section of 
the chapter, I suggest that this recognition of the epistemic but unstable underpinning of 
the ‘ageing society’ served as the context to re-build a research agenda for the ‘ageing 
society’ from the 1980s to the present day.           
Ageing society at the turn of the 21st Century  
Since the turn of the century, the ‘ageing society’ has come of age. This transition was 
marked by a variety of national and global organisations identifying population ageing as 
one of the main challenges faced by humanity, along with climate change. The tone was 
perhaps laid by the United Nations ‘International Year of Older Persons’ in 1999, which, 
under the theme of the age-inclusive society, marked a shift in ageing policies. Policy 
markers declared that whereas previous programmes were ‘focusing upon a static age 
group apart from the rest of the population, efforts [were then being] made to view aging as 
merely one stage in the course of individuals' lives’ (Kalache and Kickbusch, 1997:4 ). This 
meant that programmes should emphasise the commonalities and interdependencies 
between older people and the rest of society rather than single out a specific group.  In that 
same year, the European Commission organised a series policy conferences on ‘active 
ageing’ that also proposed an abandonment of the idea of ‘the elderly’ as a fixed group 
(Avramov and Maskova, 2004). This political orientation became later crystallised in a 
comprehensive approach to ageing through a coordination of ‘mutually reinforcing policies’ 
to tackle ‘the economic, employment and social implications of ageing’. (EC 2002:5). Similar 
pronouncements, in the same context, were made at the 2005 Whitehouse Conference on 
Ageing and, in the United Kingdom, by the Science and Technology Committee of the House 
of Lords following their major review of scientific evidence on ageing (House of Lords, 2005). 
Ageing was no longer a concern for older people alone. 
Indeed, in these policy statements, it is not difficult to identify an emerging consensus about 
the need to depart from the idea that the ‘problems of ageing’ belonged solely to the 
elderly. While acknowledging the significance of the challenge brought to bear by 
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demographic ageing,  policy makers and experts appeared to agree that instead ageing, and 
the ‘ageing society’, were to be seen as shared, societal problems. As the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon put it in a 2012 report published by the UN Population 
Fund and HelpAge International,  
“the social and economic implications of [ageing] are profound, extending far beyond the 
individual older person and the immediate family, touching broader society and the global 
community in unprecedented ways”. (UNPF/HAI, 2012: i) 
With this assessment, the UN Secretary General was advancing the idea that while ageing, 
and its consequences are most visibly and directly experienced by older individuals and their 
close social networks  -family, friends, etc. -, there are indirect, extensive  - but mostly 
invisible - implications for the wider society, and for what he labelled the ‘global 
community'.  There are two key dimensions to this statement.  
One relates to the scale of the ‘community’ that is seen to be affected by demographic 
ageing. It is not only that the consequences of ageing are society as a whole, but also that 
this society is now conceived a global entity. According to the same report, although mostly 
associated with the developed world, demographic ageing is occurring fastest in the 
developing world. This process, it is argued, further reinforces social, economic and 
technological inequalities between the Global North and South, as developing countries are 
growing old before they become rich (Kalache, Barreto and Keller, 2005).  Linking the 
‘ageing society’ with the dynamics of the global economy also problematized the ways in 
which demographic ageing had been framed and managed within national boundaries, and 
motivated the need to “emphasise the power of knowledge as a policy tool” (Olshanky et al, 
2011). This is linked to second dimension of the UN statement. 
In a context of global ageing, policy makers argued, it was necessary to create the right 
epistemic infrastructure to make the implications of the ageing society visible, tangible and 
actionable. Thus, in Ban Ki-Moon’s statement, the link between the individual case and the 
‘wider society’ is tellingly described as ‘touching’, to connote the fragile, almost 
imperceptible connection between the two.  The difficulty with understanding the ‘ageing 
society’ was then more related to the fact that it was not available to immediate experience, 
to the ‘naked eye’, so to speak. To realise the link between individual experience of ageing 
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and its wider, aggregate consequences, it was necessary to draw on a particular type of lens, 
a particular way of looking at and knowing the ageing process. What are the ways of 
looking, the knowledge practices and institutions that are so fundamental for the ageing 
society to be ‘gathered as a thing’?  
One way to answer this question is to look at how the consequences of population ageing 
are outlined. To do this, it is perhaps instructive to draw on another report published on 
that same year by Eurostat – an organ of the European Commission which provides 
statistical information to the institutions of the European Union. The report summarises the 
wider societal implications of population ageing as resulting in,  
pressure on public budgets and fiscal systems;  
strains on pension and social security systems; 
adjusting the economy and in particular workplaces to an ageing labour force; 
possible labour market shortages as the number of working age persons decreases; 
the likely need for increased numbers of trained healthcare professionals; 
higher demand for healthcare services and long-term (institutionalised) care; 
potential conflict between generations over the distribution of resources. 
(Office of the European Union, 2012: 7) 
Mostly dealing with what is commonly known as ‘facts and figures’, the report thus neatly 
identifies the knowledge domains pertaining to the ageing society: the knowledge of 
population dynamics (demography), public finances, labour market economics, health and 
social care, and the socio-economic relations between age groups. One of the most striking 
aspects of this list is the weight of economic aspects of the ageing society: resources, 
demand, labour force, markets, budgets, fiscal systems. The report proposes that there is a 
relationship between the factual reality of population ageing, of the increased proportion of 
older people in the European population, and the hard reality of economics, of money, 
markets and budgets. This bond is further evinced in the following graph,    
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Fritz von Nordheim, reproduced from Lassen and Moreira, 2014 
Taken from a presentation by Fritz von Nordheim at a European Active Ageing Conference in 
December 2012, the graph represents the current and future age pyramid for the 27 
countries of the European Union. The age pyramid is a commonly used bilateral histogram 
that divides the population into gender and age cohorts (See Chpt 4). It main advantage in 
comparison with tabular distributions of age groups is that, by its shape alone, it provides 
the viewer an assessment of the age structure ‘at a glance’. Usually, pyramids with larger 
bases are seen to represent growing, ‘younger populations’ while constricted pyramids are 
seen to belong to populations in decline.     
In the example provided, to this demographic assessment is added an economic 
qualification of the population, whereby in each age cohort are nested calculations of the 
proportions of the active and inactive members of each age group. In the graph, Nordheim, 
a social scientist specialising in European welfare systems, known for his policy work in the 
Employment and Social Affair domain, brings the two dimension of the ‘ageing society’ in 
together. On the one hand, looking at the outlines of the two pyramids, we are able to 
observe that the European population is expected to age considerably in the next four 
decades, as the older age groups become more prominent. On the other hand, looking 
within the age group bars, we become aware of distributions of working capacity within the 
population between those actively working (yellow), those unemployed but capable of 
working (grey), those incapable of working (red). From this we quickly glean a relative 
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increase of the proportion of the population not participating in the labour force. By 
classifying different age groups in this way, the graph brings to the fore the notion that links 
demographic ageing and economics: that an ageing population will see a decrease in the 
number and proportion of active, productive members of a society. This is seen to affect not 
only the economic efficiency of a nation, but also the distribution of resources across 
generations, with a smaller proportion of younger, more active members holding more of 
national income. With current arrangements relating to pensions, social security, and the 
financing of health and social care, the relative gain in income becomes lost to 
intergenerational transfers. 
One way of tracing the evolution of these transfers as an aggregate is known as the 
dependency ratio, which calculates the relationship between active members of the 
population and those receiving any transfer in the form of education, welfare, pensions, etc. 
While the most widely used dependency ratio includes both individuals bellow and above 
‘working age’ (15-16 and 65 years), in the context of demographic ageing, experts tend to 
use the more specific ‘old age dependency ratio’, which equates only person aged 65 or 
more in relation to people of working age. On the basis of these premises, Eurostat 
calculates that in 2010 there were almost 4 persons of working age  for every older person 
(26%), and projects that  in 2060 this ratio will be closer to 2/1 (50%) (Eurostat, 2012: 32).  
Nordheim’s graph above builds on these figures to calculate an even more detailed ratio 
between population not in the labour force and those actively working: the economic 
dependency ratio.  This more specific ratio attempts to shifts the focus from chronological 
age to the actual working population, regardless of age (See Chpt 5).  Curiously, however, 
instead of projecting a dramatic increase in the dependency ratio in 2050, as the Eurostat 
proposes for the old-age related calculation, the economic dependency ratio is only 
expected rise about a quarter in the next four decades. This is because Nordheim’s 
projection is based on the realisation of adequate pension reforms in the EU member states 
prior to 2020 - an imagined possibility known as the “EU 2020plus scenario” - whereby there 
is a consistent postponement of retirement mirroring life expectancy, health and 
functionality gains in the population (See Chpt 7). 
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Knowing the series of assumptions, notions and expectations on which the graph relies 
makes it acquire a different set of meanings. While previously we might have engaged with 
the graph as an accurate depiction of the evolution of the relationship between 
demographic ageing and economics in the European Union, now it represent also, perhaps 
mostly, a proposition in economic policy. What we now see is a particular solution to a 
problem, a pathway within a number of possible choices. What we now became aware of is 
that those other possibilities are not available for us to consider.  For most of us, this 
moment of doubt would not last long, returning promptly to the issue at stake and engaging 
helpfully in trying to support a solution. But what happens if, as this book proposes, we 
open this moment of doubt and explore the uncertainties within it, if we attempt to dwell in 
this space of disbelief for long enough to think about the knowledge assumptions of the 
‘ageing society’. How did we come to frame it almost exclusively by the relationship 
between demographic ageing and its economic implications? How, of all the possible 
implications of ageing, did productivity (or ‘economic activity’), budgets and transfers come 
to define the quality of the social relationships that characterise the ‘ageing society’? 
Outline of a genealogy of the ‘ageing society’  
To understand the question posed in the previous section, it is necessary, I suggest, to 
grapple with the key element of the ‘ageing society’: its population dynamics. In other 
words, the ageing society is above all a ‘population problem’. In his theorisation of 
governmentality, Foucault describes a contrast between two regimes of power-knowledge 
and forms of security. In sovereign-type States, territorial authority emanates directly from 
a central ruler, deployed through strategic knowledge about ‘enemies’. In liberal, 
governmentalized States, power is reliant instead on knowledge and management of 
populations. Defined as “a global mass affected by overall pressures of birth, death, 
production, illness” (Foucault, 2003:243), the population is understood through a series of 
‘dispositifs’ focusing on these aspects of the ‘mechanics of life’. In particular, it is contingent 
on the application of methods of data formatting and procedures of statistical analysis that 
render such mechanisms visible. Of significant relevance, in view of how the implications of 
the ageing society are imagined by key policy institutions such as the UN, is Foucault’s 
suggestion these that mechanisms are “aleatory and unpredictable when taken in 
themselves or individually, but which, at the collective level, display constants that are easy, 
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or at least possible, to establish.” (Foucault, 2003: 246). Issues such as the ‘ageing society’ 
only can exist at the aggregate, population level. 
Also important in Foucault’s conceptualisation of what he labelled the ‘biopolitics of 
security’ was the concern with the ‘economic’. Statistical measurement and calculations 
were in this respect considered part of the very apparatus that enabled economic freedom. 
This is because the governmental regime’s biopolitical technologies were geared toward 
deploying circulation of the contingent ‘natural flows’ of economic activity, through 
incentives and deterrents. In this respect, the ‘invisible hand’ of the market works to limit 
and shape the power of administrative authorities, in that it questions, through its ‘court of 
veridiction’ (prices, etc), the capacity of government to control individual action (Foucault, 
2010 :30). It is from this perspective that it is possible to appreciate Foucault’s now famous 
definition of governmentality as the “conduct of conduct”. These are forms of knowledge 
mediated administration that rely on the provision of implements to guide the 
comportment of individuals, relying thus on individuals’ management of their own conduct 
through the use of ‘technologies of the self’. For Foucault, these are productive processes, 
whereby the capacities of rational autonomy and self-determination – the homo 
economicus - are generated in entanglement with enactments of liberal, soft power.       
While Foucault has been criticised for his lack of attention to the specificities of statistical 
reasoning (e.g. Desrosieres, 2008: 101-17), and differences within liberal political 
economies, his work on biopower provides a useful handle to explore the conjunction 
between the management of populations and the economy. But to fully realise this we 
need, as suggested by Tellman (2013) and Dean (2015), to recast the role of the Malthusian 
‘problem of population’ in the consolidation of biopower. In An Essay on the Principle of 
Population, Malthus (1792) argued that increases in population would be limited by the 
more limited capacity to increase food production, or scarcity. Scarcity, he argued, was the 
key regulatory mechanism in population dynamics, directly shaping the curve of mortality 
(‘negative checks’) through famine and disease, unless ‘positive checks’ of sexual abstinence 
and/or abortion were implemented to control population growth. While Foucault focuses 
on Adam Smith and the physiocrats to understand the role of the market and wealth in 
liberal political economy, Malthus’ work placed, particularly through Ricardo’s work on rent, 
scarcity at the heart of modern economic reasoning. Such reasoning pervades the listing of 
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the consequences of the ‘ageing society’ provided by the Eurostat, with its references to 
‘pressures’, ‘strains’, ‘shortages’ and ‘conflict’ over resources. As Dean argues, in attending 
to the Malthusian ‘population problem’, it is possible to understand how “the laws of life 
are the condition of possibility of economic knowledge” (Dean, 2015: 22). 
It is somewhat surprising that Foucault linked scarcity with disciplinary power rather than 
biopolitical power, given his interest in the development of actuarial science. In his view, 
“insurance or regularizing technology” was central to the apparatus of governmentality 
(Foucault, 2003: 222), the notion of population being founded on the epistemological 
assumption that it possessed its own regularities,  “its number of dead, its number of sick, 
its regularity of accidents” (Foucault, 2009: 107). For Foucault, governmentality was 
underpinned by “the absolutely capital concept […] of risk” (Foucault, 2009: 87; Ewald, 
1991). As is well recognised, one of the central techniques of capturing these regularities 
and risks is the life table. This is a tabulation that shows, for each age, the probability of 
death within a year. It is a fundamental tool both in classical actuarial science, enabling the 
calculation of insurance rates, and in demography, to determine age-specific life expectancy 
– and, through this, to make predictions of future age structures, such as the EU27/2050 
discussed above.    
The importance of the Malthusian ‘population problem’ in both actuarial science and 
demography is embodied in Gomperz’ Law of Mortality. Gompertz, a practicing actuary 
working for Select Parliamentary Committees on Friendly Societies in the 1820s, proposed 
that mortality rates increase in a logarithmic progression (Gompertz, 1825; Kirkwood, 2015). 
Gomperz’ law is interesting because he decomposed death in two categories: those caused 
by chance, which would act in a constant, linear manner; and those caused by 
‘deterioration, or an increased inability to withstand destruction’ (Gompertz, 1825: 517). 
Chance death could be seen as representing a normalising transformation of the arithmetic 
rate governing food production in Malthus’ model, in that it replaced the catastrophic 
‘checks’ on population growth by famine and disease (Dean, 2015), by a smooth, unceasing 
force. Although chance death was excluded in Gompertz’ equation – later reintegrated by 
Mackeham – his technique enabled a calculation of ‘life contingencies’ that quickly became 
part of the standard toolkit used by insurance companies. This practice routinely attributed 
a monetary value - a worth - to a specific age. 
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While the explicit valuation of life was not new in actuarial science, it was bolstered by 
political legislation to regulate Friendly Societies' role in providing life, burial and sickness 
insurance for the working class (O’Malley, 2009), which by 1815 covered about one third of 
English households (Thane, 2000: 194).  These reforms, much swayed by Gomperz’ work for 
the Parliamentary Committee (above), required that credentialised actuaries be responsible 
for the setting of annuities in the Societies. This embedding of actuarial expertise on the 
cooperative insurance sector aimed to create the tools for incentivising thrift in the 
emerging industrial labourer population. In this respect, Gompertz’ division between chance 
death and deterioration formalised in actuarial classification the progression from ‘savage 
life’ – ensnared by the accidental - to ‘civilised life’ – characterised by planning and restraint 
- that is at the heart of Malthus theory of population (Malthus, 1792; Tellman, 2013; Dean, 
2015). Indeed, in Gompertz’ original paper, accidental and unavoidable death co-existed in 
his analysis of existing life tables (Hooker, 1965), but the latter modelled the unadulterated 
process of ageing and death. Given Gompertz admiration for Newton, it can be said that 
approximation to this ideal was not only closer to natural truth but also to ideal moral 
worth.             
Efforts to professionalise the Friendly Societies insurance schemes continued through the 
19th century. They were particularly boosted by the introduction of the first old age pension 
programme by Bismarck in 1889, which campaigners contrasted with the inadequacies of 
the Poor Law and Friendly Societies in providing for older people in Britain (Thane, 2000: 
198-199). These failures were brought to bear by various surveys of poverty in old age 
presented to a succession of parliamentary committees on the issue, such as Booth’s study 
of labourers in London. It was uncertain however whether this was due to existing schemes 
or the lack of planning and restraint by the poor. Proposals for a State-managed old age 
pension were thus hampered by concerns over its role in discouraging ‘providence’ amongst 
the working classes, and, amongst other things, by the Friendly Societies mistrust of a 
centralised scheme. There was also debate about whether this should become a 
contributory scheme, as those provided by Friendly Societies, or just reliant on means-
testing. When eventually the Old Age Pensions Bill came to parliament in 1908, qualification 
hinged on a test of demonstrable willingness to work – the ‘industry test’ – and, 
importantly, an age limit. 
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In combining these two qualifying criteria in the administrative management of old age 
pensions, the British scheme crystallised the two key categories that much later were still to 
underpin the construction of the EU27 age pyramids analysed in the previous section: 
activity and age.  In this respect, the scheme represents a paradigmatic example of the 
liberal formatting of the relationship between work and age, also present in the French or 
German social insurance approach. Crucially, it made actuarial expertise, in calculating 
present and future life expectancies, essential for the deployment of government budgets. 
This supports, in relation to old age pensions, Ewald’s (1991) claim that the emergence of 
the liberal welfare state marks their becoming ‘insurance societies’, in which new social 
bonds are enacted by insurance underwritten by the State. As Beveridge put it in his report 
on social insurance after a visit to Germany in 1908, such a ‘scheme sets up the state as a 
comprehensive organism to which the individual belongs’ (Beveridge in Hennock, 1987: 136)   
The use of ‘forecasts, statistical estimates and overall measures’ of ageing became thus 
linked to figures on economic growth, employment, taxation income, etc. in the machinery 
of the State, a tie that would only become more durable with the consolidation of the 
Welfare state in the next four decades. Ageing became part of what we, after Scott (1998), 
could label the ‘state gaze’ on society.   
Re-inventing the ageing society  
A genealogical exploration of the ageing society clarified how it belongs to the set of 
population problems enacted by liberal biopolitical regimes. In this process, ageing became 
a key articulation of the relationship between mechanisms of life and the economy, 
embodied in the practices of actuarial science. As these were incorporated in the 
administration of populations by the implementation of old age pensions, it made the 
collection of data about age, and ‘old age’ in particular a key activity of emerging welfare 
states. But these components are not enough to elucidate fully how the ‘ageing society’ 
‘gathered as a thing’ a few decades later. In the first section, we suggested that ageing 
society also assembles when the underlying – actuarial - assumptions of programmes such 
as pension schemes, and health and social care financing are challenged by the process of 
demographic ageing.  The ageing society is, to put it simply, a difference between the 
actuarial forecast and the contemporaneous reality of the population. This, I will suggest in 
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this section, is the result of the institutions of ‘old age’ being captured by another set of 
sociotechnical relations.  
Although there are mentions of the ‘ageing society’ as far back as the 1930s, for reasons we 
will explore in the next chapter, it is only in the 1970s that the concept, as we know it today, 
became established. Key in this process was the publication of the Social Policy, Social 
Ethics, and the Aging Society Report, by the Committee on Human Development of the 
University of Chicago. Drawing on a research project that combined the expertise of 
demographers with that of economists and social policy scholars, the book attempted to 
examine the ‘future of ageing and the ageing society’ (Neugarten and Havighurst, 1976: iii). 
To do this, experts assessed ‘present pattern of populations’ and crafted ‘predictions’ to 
derive consequences for the organisation of health and social services for the ‘elderly’ in the 
future. Their assessments and predictions were explicitly labelled as uncertain, as emerging 
out of novel, unexpected conditions for which it was necessary to create new form of 
knowledge and expertise. 
Indeed, almost a decade later, in what can be considered a direct offspring of the CHD 
research initiative, the US Committee on an Aging Society, could still state that, 
The ways in which an aging society might be a different society, in other than demographic 
characteristics, are not entirely clear. But it is evident that the changing age distribution of 
the population will have major implications, at the very least for the following: 
• financing, development, organization, and use of health care systems; 
• patterns of family life, social relations, cultural institutions, living arrangements, and 
physical environments; 
• distribution of jobs among older and younger workers, as well as the earnings, status, 
and satisfaction that these jobs may provide, within the context of age discrimination laws, 
seniority practices, and technological innovation; 
• economic aspects of providing retirement income through various public and private 
mechanisms; 
•  quality of life of the population throughout the life course including functional 
status, well-being, legal status, and personal autonomy; and  
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• an ever-shifting agenda of related public policy issues. 
(Committee on an Aging Society,1985: ii) 
One of the striking aspects of this list is its similarity with the EU description of the 
consequences of the ageing society three decades later, in the other side of the Atlantic.  
Indeed, the US Committee can be said to have laid the foundations of policy framing of the 
ageing society. These foundations relied, as one would expect, on a historically amassed 
collection of forms of knowledge about the ageing process brought to bear by the advent of 
old age pensions in the liberal welfare state. In the US, this had been instigated through the 
interest of the Macy Foundation of understanding the implications of Social Security Act of 
1935. This in turn had been activated by Vincent Cowdry, then a respect cell biologist, 
concern about how, in the Great Depression, such programmes sparked potential tensions 
between functional capacities of older and bureaucratic standards (Park, 2015: 69ff: see also 
chapters 5, 6 and 9). Brought together by the Macy Foundation with Lawrence Frank (see 
Chpt 2), they were responsible for organising what was to become the bedrock of 
gerontology as a field of knowledge: the Woods Hole conference on the ‘problems of 
ageing’ (Cowdry, 1939; Katz, 1996: 77-103). In particular, it had created a model of social 
organisation of knowledge – more recently known as multidisciplinary – where different  
strands of expertise (biology, philosophy, demography, etc.) come together to tackle a 
shared problem. 
While the implementation of this ideal was fraught with difficulties in the next decades 
(Achenbam, 1995), it is undeniable that it served to frame the composition of the US 
Committee on an Aging Society, which included physician-scientists - the Nobel-prize 
winning virologist and paediatrician, Frederik C. Robbins – economists, actuaries, 
epidemiologists, social scientists but also architects, occupational therapists and lawyers. 
The remit of the Committee was to collect, review and assess the ‘state of knowledge’ 
relating to specific areas of concern, such as productivity of older people, health, and the 
built environment. In so doing, they gathered together the various programmes of ageing 
research that had been sparked by the Woods Hole conference to examine the present and 
future of the ageing society. From this perspective, it is significant that the committee’s 
assessment of this corpus of knowledge is saturated with uncertainty, the nature of the 
‘ageing society’ itself not ‘being entirely clear’.  
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Crucially, this uncertainty relates to the core body of evidence on which the category of the 
ageing society is build: demography. In their paper reviewing ‘demographic trends and 
projections’, Serow and Sly suggest that, 
it is important for us  to know much more about patterns of mortality and longevity and how 
these are changing. This may sound simple, but the complexity of such knowledge is evident 
when we consider that the size of this population is influenced by historical patterns of 
fertility and mortality to the point at which persons enter old age, as well as by patterns of 
mortality throughout the older years of life— to say nothing about the patterns of 
immigration and emigration over the whole course of life. (Serow and Sly, 1988 :43)   
Casting research on the demography of ageing as ‘relatively recent vintage’, Serow and Sly 
provide an overview of the complex set of variables that enable a calculation of the 
changing relative size of ‘old age’ cohorts. Added to this complexity is the sense that the 
quality of the data and of the techniques used to compute demographic forecasts are 
uncertain, questioning whether “the knowledge provided by the demography of aging can 
help policymakers” (Serow and Sly, 1988: 43). Such a precautious assessment of the capacity 
of demography to produce accurate and reliable forecasts contrasts with the epistemic 
authority it emanated within earlier welfare ‘insurance societies’.  What we encounter 
instead is a situation where it is ‘important to know much more’ than previously thought.  
The lack of confidence in demographic forecasts is less surprising if we consider that Serow 
and Fly were writing just a few years after the ‘social security crisis’ of the turn of the 1980s.  
This event had publicly questioned the actuarial assumptions upon which old age pensions 
and other programmes had been established. Kenneth Manton, a prominent US 
demographer who was a central figure in the public debates on this ‘social security crisis’, 
recalls the processes as such:  
Before the implications of U.S. population aging became nationally visible in the Social 
Security "crisis" of 1982 and 1983, there was little analysis of the impact of the growth of the 
elderly and oldest-old population on national policy.[...] By 1982-1983 it was recognized that 
increased cohort size and improvements in life expectancy had major implications for Social 
Security and Medicare. Congressional hearings were held to examine the fiscal implications 
of fertility and mortality trends and to determine why the trends had not been identified 
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earlier […]. The systematic under-projection of the elderly population led the U.S. Senate 
Finance Committee (1983) to conclude that the official projections had received inadequate 
scientific input and the uncertainty of projections had been underestimated. (Manton, 1991: 
310-12) 
As Manton’s narrative suggests, the crisis had arisen from the political realisation of the 
implications of increased life expectancy for the pension provision and health care support 
for older citizens. Both these systems had been built on the assumption that average life 
expectancy at 65 years of age would remain more or less constant. There were good 
reasons for this. From the 1930s until the 1960s, the Medicare decade, a consensus had 
formed within population scientists and biologists that, as the National Center for Health 
Statistics would put, “further decreases [in death rate] as experienced in the past cannot be 
anticipated” (NCHS in Manton, 1991: 311).  Such prediction was underpinned by the view 
that increases in life expectancy had been driven by changes in child health and survival at 
early ages, but that these gains in life expectancy would not be reflected in the size older 
cohort because of combination of the arch of development and old age, and a natural ‘limit’ 
in human longevity. 
Breaking this consensus entailed re-examining the relationship between mortality and 
morbidity – the quantity and quality of life. In 1980, Fries had strongly reinforced the 
mainstream view by proposing that gains in prevention of illness would lead to a 
‘compression of morbidity’ against a limit of longevity (Fries, 1980; Fries and Crapo, 1981). 
This would approximate the curve of mortality to the ‘ideal’ proposed by Gompertz (above). 
It also promised a world where, by preventative medicine, time spent living with chronic 
disease was much reduced. Manton himself had been pivotal in questioning this scenario by 
arguing that while morbidity might increase in older cohorts, its severity on average would 
be reduced, leading to gains in life expectancy (Manton, 1982).  This was a possible situation 
where more people where living for longer in lighter states of disability, with obvious 
implication for planning of social security and health care programmes. Similarly, Olshanky 
and Ault suggested, a few years later, that the onset of chronic diseases would, through a 
combination of health technologies and public health, shift to older age groups (Olshanky 
and Ault, 1985). Finally, there was the prospect that effects of medical technology had done 
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nothing more than to extend the number of years older people experienced disability 
(Schneider and Brody, 1983). 
In this respect, the controversy was compounding the sense of uncertainty that emerged 
from the public realisation that ‘official projections had received inadequate scientific 
input’. It was not only that demographic and actuarial calculations became publicly deemed 
uncertain, it was also that experts could not agree on the instruments and measurements 
that should be used to evaluate the consequences of ‘demographic ageing’ on the public 
purse and the tax payer. It is from this perspective that we can read Serow and Fly’s 
irresolute review of the demographic of ageing.  There were observable uncertainties not 
only about the knowledge base for decision-making but also about the institutional 
character of knowledge-making procedures: was the administrative apparatus of the State 
adequate for collecting data related such a complex, unstable object as ageing?, did 
actuaries, demographers and epidemiologists have the right tools to understand age-
specific life expectancy or morbidity?, was there enough funding to understand the ‘fixed’ 
and malleable aspects of age-related illness?     
A similar ‘knowledge crisis’ was also emerging in the United Kingdom. Like in the United 
States with the Reagan administration, Britain had elected a few years earlier a government 
that wanted to promote economic prosperity through market-driven reforms and re-
structuration of public services, including pensions.  In this context, the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies (IFS), an independent think-tank concerned with the financial basis of state 
administration and social and economic policies, conducted a wide-ranging review of the 
social security system. Departing from the proposition that “Social Security is ‘another 
British Failure’”, Dilnot, Kay and Morris (1984: 1) quickly identified the pension system as 
the major component of this debacle:    
Over the twenty year transition period [since the implementation of the Beveridge Report], 
costs [of social insurance] would rise by about 25 percent. This increase was wholly 
attributable to the rising burden of retirement pensions. The number of people of 
pensionable age was expected to increase from 5.6 million (12 % of the population) in 1941 
to 9.6 million […]. In the event, there were 10.1 million people in this age group in 1971.[…] 
Although the number of pensioners was to increase markedly in the post-war period, the 
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number of people of working age was actually expected to fall slightly as a result of the low 
birth rate between the two world wars. The consequence was that a fixed contribution was 
to be paid by a declining number of people while demands on the fund were rising (Dilnot, 
Kay and Morris, 1984: 12-13)  
While just focusing on social security, and thus concerned with morbidity and chronic 
disease in the report, Dilnot and his colleagues could still link the problems experienced by 
the social security system to weakness in actuarial and demographic forecasts. In the British 
case, this was not only linked to the fact that the population of pensionable age grew 
proportionally more than expected, it was also that, because of this relative imbalance,  
those contributing to the scheme were less than would have been ideal. In other words, the 
IFS was suggesting that because of this statistical relationship between active and non-
active populations, the system was not sustainable. This assessment is usually linked to cut-
backs on the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) by the conservative 
government in 1986 (MacNicol, 2015: 56).   
As it should be apparent by now, we can take the various elements of these ‘social security 
crises’ as the model and the origin of the ’ageing society’.  Seen from this perspective, the 
‘ageing society’ is less about the societal consequences of population ageing, and instead 
should be viewed as knowledge-related problem. The ‘ageing society’ stands for a concern 
with ‘knowledge reflexivity’, where there is increased, widespread awareness of the 
uncertainty of the knowledge base upon which key social and welfare institutions rely. In 
this respect, the ‘ageing society’ can be seen as part of a wider transformation in 
contemporary societies in their institutional framing of knowledge processes.  
In sociology, these transformations are mainly associated with the emergence of what Beck 
(1986) labelled the ‘risk society’. Beck, drawing on Luhman and Ewald, proposed that 
members of the ‘risk society’ experienced a paradoxical combination of increased public 
awareness of technological, man-made risks and a recognition of depending on the same 
forms of scientific knowledge to assess, and of technological innovation to solve such risks. 
However, our analysis shows that, in the case of the ‘ageing society’, it is those technologies 
of risk assessment and control of contingencies that become problematized. The ‘ageing 
society’ appears at the confluence of failed past actuarial assumptions and the need to re-
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imagine the implications of such failure in the future. In this regard, the ‘ageing society’ can 
be said to derive its very existence from the uncertainty of expertise and expert calculations.    
For this reason, it is perhaps more useful to focus on this amplification of institutional 
emphasis on knowledge uncertainty. This is because what appears to characterise the 
‘ageing society’ is not a crisis in public trust about population science or economics, but a 
process of collective questioning about, of opening the relationship between knowledge 
making and social institutions, which puts uncertainty at the heart of process. The ‘ageing 
society’ corresponds to the social, reflexive process which comes from the collective 
realisation that,  
[c]ontrary to what we might have thought […], scientific and technological development has 
not brought greater certainty [but] in a way that might seem paradoxical, it has engendered 
more and more uncertainty and the feeling that our ignorance is more important than what 
we know. The resulting public controversies increase the visibility of these uncertainties. 
They underscore the extent of these uncertainties and their apparently irreducible character, 
thereby giving credit to the idea that they are difficult or even impossible to master. (Callon, 
Lacoumes and Barthe, 2009: 18).  
Such is the case of the ‘ageing society’ where controversies about life expectancy and 
disability in later life compound the already complex business of calculating budgets or 
transfers across generations. Importantly, the instability of actuarial and demographic 
forecasts brings into view the delicate foundations of welfare programmes, of the ‘insurance 
society’ as we described it in the last section. It opens those up for debate. The ‘ageing 
society’ labels the processes whereby members of a society engage in the collective – often 
conflictual - negotiation about the nature of the link between knowledge and the politics of 
ageing, enacting and making visible how ageing related expertise relates to  normative ideal 
of living together across the life course. 
In proposing this, I am diverging from other understandings of the ‘crisis of social security’ of 
the 1980s and 90s, that either see this problematisation as a result of an ideologically 
driven, neo-liberal attack on the Welfare state or suggest that knowledge uncertainty 
became a niche opportunity for the implementation of marketization reforms. I do not deny 
the existence of such drivers in the reform of social security in the last 3 decades. However, 
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if we depart from an epistemic understanding of the ageing society, the question should be 
instead focused on the knowledge making institutions that emerged within this ‘age of 
uncertainty’.  
Re-imagining ageing 
Recasting the crisis of the ‘insurance society’ as a crisis of knowledge provides a scaffold to 
explore the nexus between ageing and technoscience. If the ‘insurance society’ had relied 
on and reinforced models of ageing that enacted ‘old age’ as biological, psychological and 
socio-economic stage in life (Katz, 1996), for which specific welfare programmes were 
required, the ‘crisis of social security’ was underpinned by opening up established 
knowledge on age-related functional decline, disability and life expectancy. As we will see in 
the remaining chapters of this book, this problematisation did not begin de novo in these 
years, but was instead a parallel formatting of the ageing process, which controversies on 
demographic forecasts poignantly linked to present and future ways of organising social 
relations. This connection posed the question: what kind of knowledge and knowledge 
making institutions do we require to manage the uncertainty that inherent to the ‘ageing 
society’? 
This search for a new framework for knowledge on ageing was evident already in Manton’s 
proposals to Congress in its hearing on Life Expectancy in 1983, for example. Recognising 
the irreducible uncertainty of actuarial calculations, Manton recommended the creation of 
two ‘technical advisory groups’, one concerned with the tools and technologies of 
forecasting and the other to ‘evaluate epidemiological and biomedical evidence’ of impact 
of health technologies on mortality and morbidity patterns (Manton in Committee of 
Finance US Senate, 1983: 61). His proposals are important because they juxtapose the 
actuarial apparatus to a concern with biomedical and public health research.  In imagining 
this new system of evidence gathering Manton was partially stabilising the list of entities 
that would be relevant for the ‘ageing society’ as pertaining to longevity, health and 
dis/ability. 
Significantly, it is also within the context of the crisis of demographic forecasts that we see 
the establishment of the National Institutes of Aging (NIA) in the United States, after many 
years of failed projects to do so (Lockett, 1983). Seen as a flagship research institution 
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aiming to coordinate all nationally funded ageing research, the NIA had been set up to 
provide ‘a comprehensive investigation of the normal, physiological changes with age’ 
(Butler, 1977: 8). As we will see in Chapter 6, the idea of ‘normal ageing’ had been proposed 
as a conceptual device to imagine a distinction between avoidable and unavoidable 
morbidity and disability associated with ageing. Knowing and establishing such ‘standard’ 
was seen to be a powerful alternative to the ‘arbitrary’ age limit for work, retirement and 
health care entitlement (Chapter 5). Indeed, as Robert Butler, the first Director of the NIA, 
put in 1982:  
Economic perturbations have threatened the integrity of the Social Security System, [and 
have motivated] proposals to increase the age of social security  eligibility.[…]Because of the 
increased age of the workforce and conflicts over retirement age […], we must be able to 
assess properly the impact of aging on human performance. (Butler 1982:vi) 
Butler explicitly describes the ‘social security crisis’ as a period of heightened uncertainty 
and controversy over retirement age and its relationship with function. His view is that the 
problematisation of age graded programmes justifies and motivates a research programme 
on ‘the impact of aging on human performance’. Like Manton, Butler proposed that the key 
consequence of such debates is a focused research agenda on ageing and dis/ability, to 
establish what can be legitimately be asked and provided to older people. In so doing, he 
postpones the collective decision of rising the retirement age, and hinges such choice on 
future technoscientific research and innovation, a future he hoped would be shaped by the 
activities of the NIA. 
A similar type of imaginary supported attempts to re-organise ageing research in Europe. In  
France, where neoliberal models had less bearing, the emerging uncertainties about life 
expectancy and malleability of health and functionality in ‘old age’, most visible in the work 
of Francois Bourliere, justified  the creation of the Unite the Recherches Gerontologiques 
within the Institut National de la Sante et Recherche Medicale (Lenoir, 1979).  In Britain, 
questions about extended age specific life expectancy and the role biomedicine in this were 
also central to renewed discussions regarding the - ultimately failed - creation of a NIA-like 
institute in the United Kingdom (MRC archives).   
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But nowhere is this imaginary more visible than in the workings of the US Committee on an 
Aging Society, discussed in the previous section. Their symposia ‘did not want to propose 
national policy but to explore areas of research that might contribute usefully to the 
weighting of national choices’ (Committee on an Aging Society, 1985: vi). These areas were: 
health and ageing; ageing and productivity; and the role of assistive and ‘environmental’ 
technologies in later life. On health, the Committee, in alignment with Manton’s proposal of 
the same year, focused on healthy life expectancy, the possibility of biomedical technology 
to further it, and the economic scenarios associated with these possibilities. On activity, the 
Committee chose to complement ongoing work on working life with a specific examination 
of the role of unpaid activities in older people’s wellbeing and wider society (Committee on 
an Aging Society, 1986). On the built environment, the Committee explored the 
technological and policy implication of designing housing, transportation and tools to 
support and enhance older people daily activities (Committee on an Aging Society, 1988; 
see also Chpt 8).  
Health, activity and technology became, through these and other initiatives, the main 
transversal pillars of contemporary research agendas for the ageing society.  It is thus not 
difficult to identify an affiliation between these early attempt to reduce uncertainty by 
settle on a set of problems to be investigated, and later, more global pronouncements on 
the research infrastructure of the ‘ageing society’. For example, in the 2007 Research 
Agenda on Ageing for the Twenty-First Century, already mentioned in the introduction, the 
UN Programme on Ageing and the IAGG proposed that priorities in research could be 
decomposed in three key areas. The first aimed to understand the ‘productive contribution 
of older persons […] to the social, cultural, spiritual and economic ‘capital’ of all nations’ in 
relation to changing social security provisions and family structures (UN/IAGG, 2007: 3). 
Second, were issues to do with ‘healthy ageing’ and how it related to biomedical 
intervention and public health measures. The third concerned ‘ensuring enabling and 
supportive environments’ – physical and social - for active and healthy ageing.          
It is possible to think of these three areas as being related through a loosely coupled 
triangle. To think the ‘health’ axis, we might want to emphasise how practices of health 
production and measurement become linked to technoscientific promises of re-composition 
and regeneration of the ageing body (Moreira and Palladino, 2005; Moreira and Palladino, 
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2008), and how this might, in some instances, be configured as forms of biocapital (Rose, 
2009; Cooper, 2011). Taking work and activity as a point of entry would entail exploring how 
re-evaluations of the value of labour and its relation with ageing are entangled with health 
production, on the one hand, and ‘supportive environments’, on the other (see Chpt 7). 
Focusing on technology requires, in the first instance, understanding how through 
epidemiology and health research relations previously labelled as ‘social’ – families, 
friendships, meals, etc. – become qualified as salutary or prejudicial, leading to attempts to 
instrumentalise and manipulate them. This extension of the range of techniques or 
interventions blurs, in the case of ageing, the distinctions between biomedicine and public 
health that have prevailed in other domains (Butler et al, 2008; also Chpt 9).  
Technoscientific promises in the domain of ageing offer to modify health and work through 
a set of converging tools and forms of knowledge that range from the molecular to the 
sociological. 
From this perspective, the ‘ageing society’ is an assemblage that constrains uncertainties 
brought to bear with the crisis of actuarial projections. It can be thought of as a way of 
framing the organisation of knowledge production, technological development and policy 
formulation that is required by the indeterminate future the ‘ageing society’ formulates. A 
measure of its pervasiveness is the fact that the debate between pessimistic and optimistic 
takes on demographic ageing hinge on differences on the extent and character of the 
relationship between health, work and technology, and their consequences for economic 
policy.   Further, an indication of its stability as a mode of organising the nexus of ageing and 
technoscience is that it has remained more or less unchanged for the last three decades. To 
understand what enabled and sustained the ‘ageing society’ gathering into a thing, it is 
necessary to look deeper into the various components within each of the triangular 
relationship. This will be the main aim of the following chapters.      
    
 
 
  
